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Abstract

The U.S. financial sector has been plagued by crisis in the last few decades. The Dodd-Frank Act
was the most substantial set of reforms in recent history aimed at making the financial sector
more resilient and stable than before. We analyze the effects of the Dodd-Frank Act in reducing
systemic risk in the financial system. We find that the Dodd-Frank Act reduced systemic risk
in the financial system by conducting a panel regression on 15 of the most prominent financial
institutions in the U.S. However, our results suggest that the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act and the Global Financial Crisis ’08 coincide acting as the main driver for the reduction in
systemic risk. It is imperative to refine risk-management tools and make data more accessible
in order to protect the financial sector from future crises as the health of our economy depends
on it.
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1
Introduction

The period between 2008 and 2020 marks more than a decade of difficulties for the global
economy. In 2008, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC ’08), left a destructive trail of losses worth
trillions of dollars, and anaemic economic growths. The jolt to the economic order in the shape
of the GFC ’08 raised questions on the ability of the financial system to identify and manage
risks.
The 20th century saw the rise of ‘financial capitalism’ with financial firms at its core. The
financial system is an important part of the overall economy. When the system works well, it
channels funds to investment projects that make the economy more productive. The financial
sector is needed to deal with the short-term fall-out from any crisis and can help shape the
transformation to a sustainable economy.
Later in the 20th century, the U.S. experienced a wave of consolidation in the financial sector.
This consolidation caused a seismic shift in the finance industry. The financial products that
began to emerge their trade was based on complex computations, and formulas underlying
assets valuation. The main issue with this particular evolution of capitalism is that not many
understand its working. Financial capitalism can be hard to grasp for even the brightest, but
finance affects even the poorest. It is disconcerting that major gains accrue to only a very small
minority but losses are shared by everyone. To put things in perspective, historically it took
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the fall of empires like Rome to set-off wide-scale economic repercussions. However, in 2008 it
took the fall of only two firms (Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns) in New York to set off a
cataclysmic event that not only shaved off trillions of dollars from global wealth and GDP, but
also led to widespread joblessness. The failures of systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) or too big to fail (TBTF) firms in ‘08 bore costs to the entire system. The risk that these
TBTF firms will fail, and will have negative effects on the real economy is called systemic risk.
In normal conditions, consolidation is highly beneficial to the financial system as risk is diversified among the constituents of the financial system. Hence, under normal circumstances the
firms taking larger risks, grow in size reaching a point where the failures of these firms can impose costs on the entire system. Pre-GFC ’08 firms exploited loopholes in the regulatory capital
requirements and took a $2 trillion to $3 trillion highly leveraged bet on the housing market.
This bet was safe until the housing market took a downturn. The fact that these firms took
those bets was because of the guarantees provided by the government. When these firms almost
collapsed in 2008, the government was forced to rescue these firms, reinforcing systemic risk in
the system. Therefore, a need emerged to assess systemic risk to ensure the financial sector has
the capacity to cover its liabilities.
One of the dire consequences of GFC ’08 was that the public lost faith in a system where the
rules of the game seemed to be biased in a favor of a few. GFC ‘08 exposed the inadequate and
fragmented infrastructures hindering risk identification. The 10-member Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission formed after GFC ‘08 said regulators failed to adequately police financial markets
that led to poor risk management and corporate governance practices.
In order to restore the trust of the public in the financial system, the Obama administration
enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. In a speech at the Federal Reserve’s annual economic
policy symposium in August 2017, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen claimed that the
regulatory reforms instituted by the Dodd-Frank Act have boosted the resilience of the financial
system, promoted market discipline, and reduced the problem of too-big-to-fail. Elizabeth War-
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ren said the Dodd-Frank Act, the 2010 law that dramatically toughened financial regulation in
response to the crisis, was not perfect, but it moved us in a big step in the right direction.
The Dodd-Frank Act was one of the most profound sets of regulations with broad implications
for the entire financial system so it’s hard to term the act as an overall success. However, an
effective way to measure the success of the Dodd-Frank Act is by looking at the impact of
specific laws in the act. One of the provisions of this dense Act was establishing a new Financial
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”), charged with identifying and responding to emerging
risks throughout the financial system.
In this paper, we aim to answer the question: Did the Dodd-Frank Act reduce systemic risk
in the financial sector? To my knowledge, this empirical study is the first of its kind as there is
no literature that uses panel regressions to evaluate the impact of Dodd-Frank Act on systemic
risk.
In our study, we run a panel regression analysis on 14 U.S. bank holding companies with asset
value over $50 billion in 2010 and AIG. We chose the largest banks and insurance company in the
U.S. as a representation of the financial system considering the fact that systemic risk is mainly
generated by the bigger banks. We use a market based measure of systemic risk, ∆CoV aR,
developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) to measure systemic risk in the U.S. financial
system. This measure corresponds to the value at risk (VaR) of the financial system conditional
on institutions being under distress. Systemic risk was seen to increase pre-GFC’08 hiting its
peak in 2008. Post GFC ’08 systemic risk dipped as banks became more cautious. Now can
this decrease in systemic risk be attributed to the Dodd-Frank Act? To answer this question we
select independent variables that capture the macroeconomic environment like GDP per capita,
inflation, liquidity, and sovereign risk. Another potential confounder is the dot-com bubble as
systemic risk was high when the dot-com bubble burst. Hence, we use a dummy variable to
control for the effect of the Dot-com crisis. We also use a dummy variable to control for GFC
’08.
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According to our findings, the Dodd-Frank Act caused a meager decrease in systemic risk,

however, these results are highly sensitive to the definition of the GFC ’08. Hence, we can not
definitively conclude if the decrease in systemic risk can be attributed to the Dodd-Frank Act.
The complications of the financial system makes the study of the Dodd-Frank Act especially
challenging.
Studying the impact of Dodd-Frank Act is extremely difficult as the Act affected each bank
in a different way. No two banks have the same capital structure, and hence their exposure to
risk varies enormously. Also, the Dodd-Frank Act is work in progress, as many provisions of the
Act came into effect gradually. It is also particularly challenging to disentangle the effects of
GFC ‘08 from the Dodd-Frank Act because it was passed in a time when banks were hesitant
to take risks. We set a dummy variable to capture the effect of GFC ’08. In order to make our
findings robust, we consider four cases of the GFC ’08 where each case is a different length of
the GFC ’08. The length of the GFC ’08 is arbitrary as there are numerous stages of a crisis. A
startlingly result emerges when we consider the extreme case of GFC ’08 which stretches from
2007:Q2 to 2013:Q2. According to this result, systemic risk increased when the Dodd-Frank Act
was enacted. This revelation casts doubts on the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act.
We reflect whether our results are influenced by the big five banks in our sample which
comprise more than 75% of total assets of all financial institutions in our sample. Our results
show that the Dodd-Frank Act did not have a significantly different impact on the big five banks
as their systemic almost went down by almost the same as the other financial institutions in our
sample.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a background to the Dodd-Frank Act
and explains its main features. In Chapter 3 we review literature on systemic risk and the
Dodd-Frank Act. Chapter 4 illustrates our empirical methodology, and chapter 5 concludes
while presenting policy implications.

2
Background

In this chapter, we present a backdrop to the Global Financial Crisis ’08 and the Dodd-Frank Act.
Section 2.1 gives a summary of events that caused the financial meltdown in 2008, Section 2.2
describes consolidation as a possible cause of the GFC ’08, Section 2.3 overviews macroprudential
regulation, Section 2.4 overviews microprudential regulation, Section 2.5 finds commonalities
between macroprudential and microprudential regulation, Section 2.6 gives a comprehensive
summary of the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 2.7 assesses Dodd-Frank Act’s impact on the banking
industry, Section 2.8 aims to define systemic, and Section 2.9 looks at criticisms and the recent
rollback of the Dodd-Frank Act.

2.1 Evolution of the Global Financial Crisis ’08
The 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) sent shock waves across the globe and left a lasting
impact on the financial sector. Few could have imagined that such dramatic changes could occur
within such a short time: the rescue of Bear Stearns, and American Insurance Group (AIG),
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and government takeovers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.[8].
The crisis resulted in the collapse of the stock market, the loss of eight million jobs, and more
than four million homes were lost to foreclosures.
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The repercussions of this crisis are still felt today, such as low-interest rates and global imbal-

ances. Escalation of oil prices and insufficient flow of capital led to an almost unprecedented rise
in the US’s foreign debt and deficits in the current account. More than anything this debacle
exposed the deep fault lines in the global economy.
The Queen of England famously asked the top economists of the U.K why they didn’t see
“it” coming, where “it” referred to the GFC ‘08. This straightforward question raises some very
serious questions on the ability of forecasters to predict an economic downturn of this nature. It
was expected that a robust financial system that followed guidelines for bank capital adequacy
as laid down by the BASEL accord in the late 1980’s should generate early warning signals.
These signals were expected to help policymakers preempt future crises by giving them time to
design appropriate policy responses.
A difference of opinion exists between economists on early warning signs of a looming crisis.
Some academics emphasize that all major financial crises were preceded by large run-ups in private debt burdens. The “fundamentalists” argue that recessions are caused by some fundamental
shock to the economy, such as, a natural disaster or political instability. In the animal spirit’s
view, economic fluctuations are driven by irrational beliefs e.g prior to the GFC ‘08 people
believed that house prices would rise forever. The banking view holds that the major problem
with the economy is a weakened financial sector that stops the flow of credit. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to ascertain the cause of severe recessions, but it is helpful to understand
the developments in the financial sector in the last few decades to fully understand the source
of GFC ‘08.

2.2 Consolidation in the Financial Sector
The degree of association between financial institutions is constantly increasing and becoming
increasingly complicated through various ties. With the passage of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA), which eliminated the Glass-Steagall Act division between investment and commercial banking, the U.S. experienced a broad-based consolidation wave in the banking sector.
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GLBA led to mega-mergers in the finance sector. These mergers allowed banks to integrate
different lines of business in their original business model. In 2000, Charles Schwab acquired
US Trust Company and Chase Manhattan Corp acquired J.P. Morgan Co. In 2003, Wells Fargo
acquired Goodritz-Emanuel Insurance, Wisenberg Insurance, and McDermott Brokerage, Inc.
Post the dot-com crash of 2002, when the technology stocks came crashing down to 2008
when the GFC’08 was at its peak, monetary policy was accommodating to risk-taking. The
target federal funds rate fell from 6.50 percent in December 2000 to 1.75 percent in December
2001 and to 1.00 percent in June 2003. Low interest rates enabled an increase in activity in the
housing market which contributed to the rapid growth in house prices forming a housing bubble.
The banks seized the opportunity presented and innovated in the face of the housing bubble
coupled with cheap and readily available credit. A benign economic environment, with low
inflation, low interest rates, and steady growth increased the risk appetite for the big banks, and
demand for risky assets such as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations
began to grow.
In this suitable environment, commercial banks began to enter new lines of business such
as, underwriting and trading securities, brokerage, and investment banking which proved to be
detrimental to the stability of the financial system. Rising non-interest income for banks from
underwriting fees, commission, etc. led to pro-cyclical behavior and herding. Banks invested in a
variety of assets leading to an increase in asset prices as herd behavior triggers additional demand
for these assets. Risk assessment tools like VaR reinforced risk-taking as it is naturally procyclical in nature. As a result, banks started investing in risky assets leading to an extraordinary
level of leverage. This leverage grew within financial institutions rather than with the outside
economy. The deregulation post-GLBA and lack of effective risk management tools enabled
enormous profits for a few firms creating a powerful incentive to take risk amplifying the credit
cycle.
Consolidation creates a number of systemically important financial institutions. These institutions in the U.S as defined by the Federal Reserve, have significant on-and off-balance sheet
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risk exposures, offer a broad range of products and services at the domestic and international
levels, and are subject to multiple supervisors in the United States and abroad.
In the GFC ‘08, the term “Too-big-to-fail”, (TBTF) was first introduced by the U.S. Congressman Stewart McKinney in a 1984 Congressional hearing, gained prominence and became
a part of public discourse. This term primarily refers to systemically important financial institutions, however, TBTF emerged from government guarantees of repayment of large uninsured
creditors of the largest banks so that no depositor or creditor suffers a loss. Federal Reserve
Chair Ben Bernanke also defined the term in 2010: ”A TBTF firm is one whose size, complexity,
interconnectedness, and critical functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into
liquidation, the rest of the financial system and the economy would face severe adverse consequences.”[18].We can deduce that if a systemically important firm or TBTF firm experiences a
severe financial problem it could lead to a disorderly resolution process that could have a serious
impact on both domestic and international financial markets.
Case in point: on 15 September 2008 when the insolvent Lehman Brothers, one of the five
largest US investment banks, filed for bankruptcy the world witnessed the full threat potential of
a global financial system with a growing population of TBTF banks. In less than a week, Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs, the two largest remaining US investment banks, were classified as
bank holding companies, and thus given TBTF protection as they were insolvent.
The combination of consolidation and increased market activity may help an idiosyncratic
shock to an individual firm to propagate more widely. For example, if a weakened firm sells
a large number of marketable assets this could depress prices significantly, and thus weaken
institutions that are holding similar assets. It can be argued that bank size and scope of activity
is a principal cause of crises, a 2013 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) report stated: “A
bank’s distress or failure is more likely to damage the global economy or financial markets if its
activities comprise a large share of global activity.”[17].
Once a TBTF institution is in crisis, its individual risks will be rapidly transmitted through
relationships of assets and liabilities, the irrational herd effect of investors and market expecta-
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tions. Subsequently, other financial institutions will further magnify the external influence of the
financial institutions’ risks and may even cause catastrophic damage and huge systemic losses
to the entire financial system and seriously jeopardize the sound and smooth operation of the
entire economic society. [10].
The traditional financial supervision of individual financial institutions has made it difficult
to monitor the systemic risk (discussed later) of such financial institutions. Contagion and connectedness of institutions make it easy for risks to be transferred among institutions. A long
time belief that by safeguarding individual institutions, the entire financial system will be safe
was seen to fail in practice as financial institutions tend to behave in a manner that jointly
undermines the financial system so it is imperative to understand the difference between microprudential and macro-prudential regulation.

2.3 Macroprudential Regulation
Macroprudential policies address risks to the financial system as a whole. The health of Individual
financial institutions are a necessary condition for a sound financial system. However due to the
complexity of the financial system and due to “fallacy of composition” actions apparently suitable
at the institutional level can destabilize the system as a whole because of their interaction with
financial markets, the structure of the network of which they are part, and the behavior of other
financial institutions. [30].
Macroprudential policy aims to lean against the financial cycle and to strengthen the resilience
of the financial system. The objective of macroprudential policy is to avoid output and wealth
losses in the long run by limiting the buildup of system-wide financial risk by acting as a
countervailing force to the natural decline in measured risks in a boom and the subsequent rise
in measured risks in the downturn. Macroprudential policy adjusts overall levels of capital based
on the financial cycle and systemic relevance to guard against systemic risk buildup. The role
of macroprudential policy is to identify risk concentrations, common exposures, linkages, and
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interdependencies that are sources of contagion and spillover risks, and to issue advice or take
action if it feels like these events may give rise to systemic concerns.
Once the financial cycle turns and losses begin to emerge, the macroprudential concern is with
stabilizing the broader system and avoiding excessive deleveraging pressures that—if acute—can
lead to or exacerbate a crisis, with loss of confidence and a credit crunch. The macroprudential
authority seeks to detect threats to the stability of the financial system stemming from other
public policy areas (e.g., microprudential, macroeconomic, structural, etc.). Macroprudential
policy can help contain systemic risk by alerting relevant authorities or pushing for reaction.

2.4 Microprudential Regulation
The objective of microprudential regulation is to promote the safety and soundness of banks
and the banking system. The microprudential authority performs the supervisory function and
leads the relationship with the individual firm. The microprudential approach is to reduce the
likelihood of failure of individual institutions and idiosyncratic risk, regardless of their impact on
the economy. Microprudential policies examine the responses of an individual bank to exogenous
risks and do not incorporate endogenous risk and the interconnectedness with the rest of the
system.
Microprudential policy adjusts capital based on individual institutions’ risks. Microprudential
policy instruments, such as risk-based capital adequacy requirements, can be procyclical. For
example, in times when risk is perceived to be high, selling an asset could be seen as a prudent
response by an individual bank. But if many banks follow this approach, asset prices will collapse,
and such generalized downswings in asset prices may lead to huge volatility in asset markets.
The microprudential supervisor is mainly concerned with the minimum level of capital needed
to ensure the resilience of an individual institution at any given point in time. Once the financial
cycle turns and losses begin to emerge, the microprudential concern is to ensure the stability
of the individual firms. Microprudential regulation largely ignores the systemic importance of
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individual institutions in terms of its size, complexity, extent of leverage, and interconnectedness
with the rest of the financial system. [22].

2.5 Areas of Overlap
There are a number of areas in which macroprudential and microprudential mandates overlap.
Solvency and liquidity risks which fall under the microprudential supervisor can quickly spread
through the whole economy through fire sales and contagious runs increasing systemic risk.
Confusion arises in who is ultimately responsible for addressing emerging systemic risk. The microprudential supervisor needs to take into account risks arising from the external environment.
These system wide risk assessments are carried out by the macroprudential supervisor. We will
discuss systemic risk in detail later in this chapter.
There was a need to introduce legislation that accounted for both macroprudential and microprudential regulation as separating the two roles had not been effective in reducing risk. The
disorders that resulted from the GFC ‘08 caught the government’s attention as the frequent
boom-and-bust cycles left everyone worse off. To make matters worse, bankers paid themselves
handsome bonuses from a public bailout. In order to restore the public’s trust in the financial
system, the financial system had to be redesigned to mitigate risk and protect investors from
asset bubbles. The Dodd-Frank Act was proposed in Congress by Chris Dodd and Chairman
Barney Frank on December 2nd, 2009.

2.6 Dodd-Frank Act
On July 21st, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act which was by far the largest
financial reform since the Great Depression. This Act brought changes in the financial regulatory
landscape of the United States that was built over more than a century in response to crises.
New regulatory institutions were formed and responsibilities increased for existing regulatory
entities marking a significant shift in the complex and fragmented regulatory system in the U.S.
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A central element of the Dodd-Frank Act is the requirement that the Federal Reserve and
other financial regulatory agencies adopt the macroprudential approach. In concrete terms, The
Dodd-Frank Act setup a new body, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to monitor the U.S
financial system by identifying risks that threaten the stability of that system, and promoting
market discipline that mitigates excessive risk-taking in financial markets. The Dodd-Frank Act
also established within the Treasury Department, the Office of Financial Research, which is
responsible for improving the quality of financial data available to policymakers which allows
regulators to see more of the financial landscape and better equip them to identify systemic risks
and other emerging threats.
In terms of microprduential regulation, the Dodd-Frank Act provided its own stringent capital
guidelines and introduced stress testing. The Dodd-Frank act requires bank holding companies
with at least $50 billion in assets to maintain a leverage ratio of at least 6.5% to mitigate
the risk of illiquidity in these firms. Furthermore, the supervisors increased emphasis on the
effectiveness of banks’ own capital planning processes so banks are in a better position to meet
capital requirements set by regulators. Under stress testing, expected capital ratios of banks
under a hypothetical economic downturn are compared to regulatory benchmarks. Stress tests
are a structured way for supervisors to assess if banks hold enough capital, know whether banks
can accurately assess their risk exposures, and access credible information about prospective
losses at banks.
The Dodd-Frank Act has a wide scope as it aims to reduce the systemic risk in the finance
sector. More broadly, this Act is a preventive measure that restricts the recurrence of potential
financial catastrophes in the future by reforming the operational procedures of many institutions.
It impacts a wide range of financial services companies including banks, hedge funds, thrift,
mortgage businesses, insurance companies, and credit rating agencies among others. Reforming
these industries which are the backbone of the financial sector in the U.S. is imperative to
meet the aims of the Dodd-Frank Act which is to promote the financial stability of the U.S. by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system. In order to meet these far-
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reaching and substantial goals, the Dodd-Frank Act comprises of 16 titles that each addresses a
significant matter.
Title 1 takes into consideration systemic risk of the financial system and creates two new governmental agencies: the Financial Stability Oversight Council and Office of Financial Research.
These agencies identify risk and promote market discipline.
Title 2 creates the Orderly Liquidation Fund to address the insolvency of financial companies.
Title 3 increases the maximum amount of deposits insured by FDIC and abolishes the Office
of Thrift Supervision.
Title 4 mandates three studies by the Government Accountability Office and Security Exchange Commission and seeks to improve transparency by mandating reporting requirements.
Title 5 creates the Federal Insurance Office to identify regulatory gaps that could lead to a
future crisis.
Title 6 creates a separation between banking and other types of financial services and calls
for disclosure of capital requirements.
Title 7 regulates over-the-counter swaps and directs the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to define security swap terms and oversee the derivative markets.
Title 8 gives more power to the Federal Reserve to create uniform standards and regulations
that target too-big-to-fail financial institutions.
Title 9 mandates the creation of the Office of the Investor Advocate to develop point-ofsale disclosure rules for investors. It gives the SEC the power to regulate shareholder proxy
materials, and also regulates asset-backed securities while mandating disclosure of incentivebased compensation.
Title 10 creates an independent Bureau of Consumer Protection that is tasked to research,
track complaints, ensure fair lending, and improve financial literacy.
Title 11 gives the President the authority to appoint the New York Fed President and creates a
new position for vice chairman to supervise the Board of Governors. This title includes provisions
for the FAO to audit the Federal Reserve.
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Title 12 creates programs such as financial education, microloans, banking the unbanked etc
to utilize mainstream financial services.
Title 13 amends the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, and Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 while reducing
the funds available to the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Title 14 regulates mortgage originators by creating an Office of Housing Counseling within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development and defining “high-cost mortgages”. This title
also defines property appraisal requirements and tasks the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to introduce a mortgage resolution and modification program.
Title 15 includes some miscellaneous laws that relate to natural resource mining etc.
Title 16 gives a new definition to marked to market trades in Section 1256 contracts to exclude
derivatives and futures contracts or options.

2.7 Dodd-Frank’s Impact on the Banking Industry
The segments of the markets and institutions affected by the Dodd-Frank Act include the derivatives market, insurance companies, and broker dealers. However, one of the most affected institutions by the Dodd-Frank Act were the bank holding companies. Although there is no one
all-encompassing definition of a financial crisis, the GFC ‘08 in the United States is widely
considered to have been a banking crisis. There are different charters a banking institution can
choose, and regulations depend on the charter of the bank which can be obtained at the state
or federal level; these charters include, foreign banking organizations, consumers and mortgage
banking, commercial banks, credit unions, thrifts and bank holding companies.
Commercial banks focus on banking needs of businesses whereas thrifts serve the mortgage
needs of those not served by commercial banks. Credit unions are member-owned cooperatives
run by member elected boards, and serve people with modest means. A bank holding company
is a corporation that owns a controlling interest in one or more banks but does not offer banking
services itself. According to the Fed, Foreign Banking Organizations carry out a wide variety of
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banking activities through subsidiaries, branches, agencies, and representative offices in the U.S.
Consumer banks provide services to consumers such as financial advice, mortgages and saving
accounts.
Broadly, bank regulators establish capital requirements, monitor a bank’s financial condition,
and monitor compliance with banking laws. Regulators also issue regulations, take enforcement
actions, and close banks they determine to be insolvent. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act
directly targets banks and has been in force since July 21, 2015. This section is the Volcker
rule that restricts banks from engaging in proprietary trading and sponsoring hedge funds and
private equity firms. Under the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) which takes the capital adequacy
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act into consideration, banks are also required to hold sufficient
capital.
With respect to Foreign Banking Organizations (FBO), an FBO is defined as a bank holding
company if it has a consolidated asset value of over $50 billion, and is considered a systemically
significant institution. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) determines whether a
bank is systemically important, and this decision is based on the possible threat that this foreign
bank holding company poses to the U.S financial system. The regulations applicable to FBOs’
in their home countries are applied to the standards for U.S. comparable U.S. bank holding
companies. It is important to note that the Volcker rule does not apply to FBOs’, but they are
still mandated to maintain minimum capital requirements.
Mainly, the Dodd-Frank Act affected banks in two ways. One, it created downward pressure
on the profitability of the banking industry. Two, it created upward pressure on capital requirements. Sufficient capital is needed to sustain losses in a downturn whereas higher compliance
and regulatory requirements meant banks had to hire new people or in some cases build new
departments to comply with the new regulations. Furthermore, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency creates downward pressure on profits in the shape of fees and commissions from
mortgages, lending, and other credit products. The greater authority provided to this agency
through the Dodd-Frank Act affects banks’ profitability. Also, the swap-push out provision in-
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troduced by Senator Blanche, reduced the leverage available to banks which according to some
measures increased from 12-to-1 in 2004 to 33-to-1 in 2008.
One of the main features of the Dodd-Frank act was to remove TBTF banks. Specifically,
Section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to eliminate emergency funding to individual firms. There was some skepticism around this rule if it
is only adopted in the U.S as it could affect U.S’s financial competitiveness. Other countries
can benefit from TBTF banks as these banks generate higher investment returns making their
markets more attractive to the investor. Another way TBTF and other big banks made staggering profits was through investment advisors who charge high fees and banks earn revenue.
Infamously, in the follow-up to GFC ‘08, Goldman Sachs made tens of millions of dollars by
betting against their own clients through shorting the housing market and simultaneously sold
Mortgage-Backed Securities to their clients.

2.8 Systemic Risk
The Dodd-Frank Act focuses on systemic risk. Through the GFC’08 we learned a single institution’s risk measure does not necessarily reflect its contribution to overall systemic risk. In times
of financial crisis, losses spread across financial institutions, threatening the financial system as
a whole. The spreading of distress gives rise to systemic risk—the risk that the intermediation
capacity of the entire financial system is impaired, with potentially adverse consequences for the
supply of credit to the real economy. The externality of financial institution risk means that a single financial institution increases its profits by expanding its balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet
business scale and leverages, and controls its own risks through financial innovation; however,
the risks within the entire financial system do not simply disappear but are instead transferred
and redistributed. Thus, the health of a single financial institution does not necessarily mean
that the entire financial system is safe. [21].
As we discussed earlier, consolidation has led to larger organizations taking on larger risk
exposures to individual obligations or industries increases financial risk. Financial risk is defined
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to encompass both individual financial institutions and a systemic financial crisis. A systemic
crisis disrupts the stability of the financial system which has serious consequences for the whole
economy. The Group of Ten has defined Systemic Risk by: “Systemic financial risk is the risk
that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in
uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite
probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy. Systemic risk events can be sudden
and unexpected, or the likelihood of their occurrence can build up through time in the absence
of appropriate policy responses. The adverse real economic effects from systemic problems are
generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit flows, and from the
destruction of asset values.”[29].
Systemic risk is one of the most elusive concepts in finance. Policymakers, regulators, academics, have yet to reach a consensus on how to define systemic risk. The European Central
Bank (ECB) defines it as a risk of financial instability “so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where economic growth and welfare suffer materially.”
[27].
Once a financial event has become systemic, effects on the real economy are generally thought
to occur potentially through three channels. First, payment system disruptions, including bank
runs, may cause the failure of illiquid but solvent firms. Second, disruptions in credit flows may
create severe reductions in the supply of funds to finance profitable investment opportunities in
the real economy. Third, collapses in asset prices may induce failures of financial firms as well as
non-financial firms and households, and decrease economic activity through a decline in wealth
and an increase in uncertainty.
Let’s consider an example to fully understand how systemic risk perpetuated in the financial
system can bring the entire economy to the brink of collapse. Suppose there are three banks in
the entire economy: bank A, B, and C. Bank A has $5 billion in assets which includes $2 billion
in CDOs, and $3 billion in loans. Bank A also has $4 billion in liabilities, hence, it has a net
worth of $1 billion. For simplicity let’s assume bank A, B, and C have the same balance sheets.
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The liabilities of Bank A include loans from bank B. The loans given out by bank B to bank A
are recorded as assets in bank B’s balance sheet. $1 billion out of $5 billion bank A has in assets
is a loan to bank C which is recorded as liability for bank C. Bank C lends $1 billion to bank B
which is an asset for bank C, but a liability for bank B. When the loan from bank B made to
bank A comes due, bank A has to rely on the CDOs which are its most liquid assets. However,
we know that the CDOs consisted of toxic assets which even the Fed wasn’t ready to accept
as collateral, so bank A has to file for bankruptcy. Then bank B is in distress because it owes
money to bank C, and the CDOs are worth nothing as they’ve been downgraded by the rating
agencies, so bank B has to write down its assets to $4 billion as bank A is not coming good on
the loan. Bank’ B total assets now equal $2 billion down from $5 billion which are illiquid so
bank B has to file for bankruptcy. Consequently, bank C comes under distress, and there is a
chain reaction in the financial sector causing multiple banks to fail, and systemic risk to rise.

2.9 Criticisms and Rollback of the Dodd-Frank Act
Just like with any other piece of legislation, there were concerns on the effectiveness of the DoddFrank Act in making the financial system safer and efficient while fostering economic growth.
In May 2018, President Trump signed an executive order that was the biggest rollback of bank
regulations since the GFC. The rollback included raising the threshold to $250 billion from $50
billion under which banks are deemed too important to the financial system to fail. This implies
that those institutions would not have to undergo stress testing. These measures were in line
with President Trump’s deregulation plan, however, aside from politics critics of the Dodd-Frank
Act raise genuine concerns that demand attention.
Regarding the firm-level impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, researchers at the Minneapolis Federal
Reserve estimate that the cost of increased regulation could have decreased community banks’
return on assets by between 12 and 14 basis points. Due to this heavy compliance burden
and loss in revenue, small banks are disappearing. Small banks or community banks focus on
relationship banking which help them serve the needs of a diverse U.S. economy composed
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of different businesses and consumers with diverse needs. Losing community banks exposes
the financial system to higher systemic risk from larger banks as community banks pose little
systemic risk to the nation’s financial system.
The Dodd-Frank Act also included a provision that bans the Fed from providing emergency
loans to a single firm, as it did in 2008 with AIG and Bear Stearns. Instead, these loans are offered
to a category of institutions. It is feared that by restricting the Fed’s ability to bailout financial
we can see a number of runs on insolvent institutions leading to panic, and consequently hurting
the real economy. Moreover, it can be argued that the Volcker rule has dramatically reduced
the liquidity of corporate bonds and other fixed-income markets, leaving financial markets more
vulnerable to future crises. In a nutshell, critics argue that the Dodd-Frank Act did little to
address the root causes of the crisis, and simply expanded the federal safety net for financial
firms.
By some measures, the Dodd-Frank Act can be characterized as a “work in progress” as it has
some unfinished business in respect to streamlining the U.S. financial regulatory architecture.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act improves access to financial data, the overlapping jurisdictions
of regulatory bodies create friction and prevents a single body to take an overall view of the
financial system. When it comes to credit rating agencies, the Dodd-Frank Act mandated the
removal of credit ratings from regulations—a process that unfortunately remains incomplete.
This mandate limits competition by curbing the entry of new firms, and hence three firms
dominate the credit rating market.
The Financial CHOICE Act, passed by the House in June 2017, relaxes some Dodd-Frank
regulations but leaves most of the regulatory framework in place. The CHOICE Act of 2017
allows firms to bypass quite a few amounts of Dodd-Frank regulations if financial organizations
choose to be well-capitalized. The CHOICE Act proposed repealing the Volcker Rule to restructure the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The future of the Dodd-Frank Act hinges on
the political climate and administration changes. The Biden-Sanders unity task force called for
strengthening the Dodd-Frank Act, in particular calling for more separation of commercial and
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investment banking activities, and the creation of a federal credit reporting bureau at the CFPB.
President Biden pledged to boost the Dodd-Frank Act, but is still vague on the details.

3
Literature Review

Vast amounts of literature has been produced to answer the critical question regarding the
changes in the financial system as a result of the rigorous and complex financial regulations that
were imposed since GFC ‘08. In this chapter, we review papers that evaluate the Dodd-Frank Act
(Section 3.1), define systemic risk and its implications in a crisis (Section 3.2), compare different
systemic risk measures (Section 3.3), and assess the effectiveness of regulation in creating a
resilient financial system (Section 3.4).

3.1 Dodd-Frank Act
The global financial crisis, which erupted in the middle of 2007, (GFC’08) has highlighted the
inadequacy of existing banking regulations with regards to safeguarding systemic stability. [44].
Allen et al. (2018) consider some important questions in designing effective financial regulations
to achieve financial stability and mitigate systemic risk. They conclude that regulators have
placed regulations that are dependent on complex models. The authors suggest simpler and more
nimble regulations as complex subjective regulation leads to ambiguity and market manipulation.
An important aspect of the paper is the review of the Dodd-Frank Act which is considered the
largest financial reform since the Glass Steagall Act 1935. Among other things, the Dodd-Frank
Act required banks to be better capitalized to absorb unexpected losses during downturns.
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Mainly, the Dodd-Frank Act serves two objectives. Its first objective is to limit the risk
of contemporary finance aka shadow banking systems. The second objective is to limit the
destruction caused in the event that a systemically important institution does indeed fail, despite
everyone’s best efforts to prevent that from happening. [40].
Balasubramniana et al. (2014) argue that the Dodd-Frank Act has statistically and economically improved market discipline even for large banks. Market discipline aids bank regulators
in identifying riskier banks and in taking appropriate regulatory actions to prevent excessive
risk-taking. [19].
The Dodd-Frank Act introduced stress testing which assesses the impact on capital levels that
would result from immediate financial shocks. Acharya et al. (2017) focus on the U.S. bank stress
tests – the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)- of 2009 and the Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), conducted since 2011. The difference-in-difference method
is used to study the effects of the stress tests. Their investigation is focused on the supply of
credit, particularly to relatively risky borrowers. The dependent variable is loan spread whereas
control variables include capital adequacy, liquidity, and the log of the book value of assets of the
borrower. They conclude that banks subject to stress tests reduced credit supply to relatively
risky borrowers to decrease their credit risk, uncovering a positive impact of the Dodd-Frank
Act on financial stability. [3].
Schafer et al. (2013) investigate whether financial reforms over the world have had any measurable effects by carrying out an event study analysis on the four major regulatory reforms in
Europe and the United States. These reforms include the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States,
the reforms proposed by the Vickers report in the United Kingdom, the restructuring law and
bank levy in Germany, and the TBTF regulation in Switzerland. By analyzing the reaction of
stock returns and credit default spreads of banks they conclude that financial markets reacted
most strongly to the structural reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act. [39].
Nolle (2012) considers US policy initiatives, the Dodd-Frank Act, related to a core dimension
of a financial system reform: risks posed by systemically important financial institutions. More
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importantly, this paper explores the question “Are US domestic and international financial
system reform commitments in sync?”. Nolle finds that the G20/FSB focus, at least over the
near term, is bank-centric compared with the Dodd-Frank Act, which consistently addresses
both bank and nonbank financial firms. [25].
Mohanty et al. (2018) examine the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) and Basel III on
the market risk-taking behavior of global banks by measuring the change in risk from the preGFC’08 period to the post-European debt crisis period. The results show a significant increase
in each measure of risk (total risk, market risk, and idiosyncratic risk) for Globally Systemically
Important Bank (G-SIBs) from the pre-GFC’08 period to the post-GFC’08 period, so they
conclude that post-GFC’08 reforms have not been effective in reducing the risk of global banks.
[34].
Ever since the Dodd-Frank Act passed there has been a copious amount of literature produced
to assess the effectiveness of the Act in increasing bank resiliency among other things. Considering some important questions on the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act to mitigate systemic
risk in the banking sector, Allen et al. (2018) claim that not all risk taken by the financial sector
is necessarily risky implying that the problem does not lie in taking risks, but in managing risks.

3.2 Systemic Risk
The traditional view of risk in the financial system is the summation of individual risks within
the system. However, GFC’08 has driven home that this view of risk is inadequate. It is the
interactions of financial institutions and markets that determine the risks that drive financial
crises. [9]. A financial institution faces significant risks such as market, credit, operational, and
liquidity risks. A critical risk that emerged from the GFC’08 was systemic risk. Note that
these risks are firm-specific whereas systemic risk affects the ecosystem the firm is operating in.
Systemic risk is the risk that the failure and distress of a significant part of the financial sector
reduces the availability of credit, which, in turn, may adversely affect the real economy. [2].
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Allen et. al (2013) identify four types of systemic risk. These are banking crises due to multiple
equilibria, asset price falls, contagion, and foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system.
Ozdaglar and Salehi (2015) claim that the current state of uncertainty about the nature and
causes of systemic risk is reflected in the potentially conflicting views on the relationship between
the structure of the financial network and the extent of financial contagion. [1].
There is a range of scholarship on the subject of financial consolidation. In their seminal
paper, Allen and Gale (2000) argue that a more interconnected financial architecture enhances
the resilience of the system as in a densely interconnected financial network, the losses of a
distressed bank are divided among more creditors, reducing the impact of negative shocks to
individual institutions on the rest of the system. [10]. Blume et al. (2013) model interbank
contagion as an epidemic saying that “over-linking” in networks with contagious risk can have
strong consequences for the welfare of the participants. An important reason for the growing
interconnectedness of the financial system has been attributed to the shadow banking sector.
[20].
Adrian et al. (2013) discuss the role of shadow banks as financial intermediaries that provide
credit by issuing liquid, short-term liabilities against risky, long-term, and often opaque assets.
They argue that an understanding of the “plumbing” of the shadow banking system is an
important underpinning for any study of financial system interlinkages and systemic risk as the
role of shadow banking in the financial system is expected to grow. [6].
Nier et al. (2008) investigate how systemic risk is affected by the structure of the financial
system by constructing a banking system with high contagion. They reach the following conclusions: more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic risk,
better-capitalized banks are more resilient in the banking system against contagious defaults,
and the size of interbank liabilities tends to increase the risk of contagion default. [12].
As Anand et al. (2013) explain firesale externalities, and funding liquidity risk also poses a
huge risk to financial stability. These factors generate “fat tails” in the distribution of aggregate
losses for the banking system. For instance, the interaction of people in the financial markets
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who come together at the worst time, sell the same toxic assets, and generally behave in the
same way increasing systemic risk which in turn causes the financial system to crash. Anand
et al. (2013) obtain plausible fat-tailed aggregate loss distributions in their model consisting
of a diverse set of financial agents, namely domestic banks, overseas banks, and firms, which
are linked together by their claims on each other. This model is evidence that contagion or
interconnectedness leads to systemic risk in the system. [14].
Tarashev et al. (2009) present a methodology that takes as inputs measures of system-wide
risk and allocates them to individual institutions as it is important to distinguish between
microprudential and macroprudential supervision; the former focuses on the financial system as
a whole, whereas the latter focuses on individual institutions. By applying the methodology to
real-world data on a sample of 20 large internationally active financial institutions, Tarashev et
al. (2009) conclude that none of the financial institutions, taken in isolation, is a fully satisfactory
proxy for systemic importance. [37].
Bisias et al. (2012) surveys the systemic risk measures and conceptual frameworks that have
been developed over the past several years by emphasizing those analytics that could be most
easily estimated and accessed. They argue that because systemic risk is a multifaceted problem
in an ever-changing financial environment, any single definition is likely to fall short and may
create a false sense of security. Hence, in their view, the specific measures regulators ultimately
choose to deploy will become the effective definition of systemic risk. [26].
Benoit et al. (2013) defines systemic risk as measuring the contribution of a given financial institution to the risk of the system. They argue that there are two ways to measure systemic risk.
One approach relies on information on positions and risk exposures. This confidential information is provided by the financial firms to the regulator. The second approach only relies on public
market data, such as stock returns, option prices, or CDS spreads, as they are believed to reflect
all information about publicly traded firms. [41]. In this paper, they compare the four most popular measures of systemic risk Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and the Systemic Expected
Shortfall (SES) of Acharya et al. (2010), the Systemic Risk Measure (SRISK) of Acharya, Engle,
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and Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012), and the Delta Conditional Value-atRisk (CoVaR) of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). According to their empirical analysis of these
measures, they conclude that these measures fall short in capturing the multifaceted nature of
systemic risk. [41].

3.3 Systemic Risk Measures
Adams et al. (2014) propose a state-dependent sensitivity (SDS) VaR for quantifying risk
spillovers among sets of different financial institutions. Reevaluating systemic risk measures
such as VaR was an important lesson of GFC ’08. VaR underestimated the risk magnitude of
portfolios of subprime mortgages. Adams et al. (2014) estimate a system of quantile regressions
for four sets of financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and
insurance companies). They find that the SDSVaR model seems useful for measuring and quantifying spillover effects, however, it does not explain the mechanisms underlying the estimated
spillovers. [5].
White et al. (2010) propose a vector autoregressive (VAR) model in which the dependent variable is VaR (Value at Risk) to assess the systemic importance of individual financial institutions
and of the overall market. The authors use multivariate regression quantiles to measure directly
the tail dependence among the random variables of interest. Their methodology provides an
alternative for stress testing, but they fail to produce a single number that can act as a measure
for systemic risk. [45].
Sedunov (2016) investigates whether a systemic risk measure provides a forecast of future
exposures by examining the relationship between the current measure of systemic risk and its
lagged values. The three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure he investigates are
Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (SES, Acharya
et al. 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al. 2012). Sedunov concludes that a modified version
of the CoVaR measure based on Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) is more effective in forecasting
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systemic risk exposure compared to other methods such as SES and Granger causality as they
lack statistical significance in empirical tests of their forecasting ability. [32].
To assess risk at a system-wide level, we use ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2016).[7]. ∆CoV aR aims to capture systemic risk in the financial system. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) derive ∆CoV aR from CoV aR which is institution i’s CoV aR relative to the
system. To fully understand, ∆CoV aR we need to have a solid understanding of VaR.
Before GFC ’08, VaR was considered the main tool to measure risk. VaR is a very simple
and popular way of measuring risk. VaR measures the maximum loss in value of a portfolio
over a predetermined time period for a given confidence interval. In its most common form, it
measures the boundaries of risk in a portfolio over short durations, assuming a “normal” market.
For instance, if you have $50 million of weekly VaR at the 95% confidence level, that means that
over the course of the next week, there is 0.95 probability that your portfolio won’t lose more
than $50 million.
VaR measures portfolio risk along what is called a “normal distribution curve.” VaR uses this
normal distribution curve to plot the riskiness of a portfolio. As you increase the confidence
interval, to 99%, VaR increases as 99% VaR occurs further in the tail. There are three key
elements that describe VaR: time period, dollar amount of VaR (total value of assets or portfolio),
and a confidence interval.
The following mathematical formula is used to calculate VaR. Given a confidence level of
p ∈ [0, 1] and time index of t + α, let Fα (x) = P (∆V (α) ≤ X) be the cumulative distribution of
∆V (α) where ∆V (α) is the loss in value of the asset or portfolio over the next time period α.
Since ∆V (α) ≤ 0, we can define VaR over time horizon α for p as

p = P[∆V (α) ≤ V aR] = Fα (V aR)

The p-quantile of Fα (x) is given by:

V aRp = glb{x|Fα (x) ≥ p}
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That is x such that Fα (x) ≥ p.

There are mainly three approaches to compute VAR — historical simulation method, montecarlo simulation method and parametric approach. The most popular method is the RiskMetrics
methodology to calculate VaR which was invented by J.P Morgan in the 1980s. JPMorgan’s
chairman Dennis Weatherstone had long been known as an expert on risk. He pushed the quant
team to create VaR to gauge the possibility that any kind of portfolio could lose a certain amount
of money over the next 24 hours, within a 95 percent probability.

1

In this model, the daily log return is given by rt and the data is given by Ft−1 at time t − 1.
The conditional normal distribution is given by rt |Ft−1 ∼ N (µt , σt2 ) where µt is the conditional
mean and σt2 is the conditional variance of rt .
To calculate VaR in a k-period horizon, we define rt [k] = rt+1 + rt+2 + ... + rt+k . Since
rt+1 + rt+2 + ... + rt+k are independent and identically distributed as RiskMetrics VaR assumes
that a portfolio’s profit and loss over the VaR horizon (e.g., one day, two weeks, or one month)
conforms to a normal distribution in accordance with the central limit theorem. Therefore the
2 . So, the conditional normal distribution in a
conditional mean is rt [k] = 0. Hence σt2 [k] = kσt+1
2 ).
k-period horizon is given by rt [k]|Ft ∼ N (0, kσt+1

There are many limitations of VaR as a risk measure. Mainly, VaR does not meet the objective
of risk management. The central objective of risk-management is to manage risks, however, VaR
empowers bad policy decisions like massive leverage on positions with enormous risks in the tail.
VaR creates a false sense of security among senior management as they are just looking at the
worst case loss, and not how to deal with the loss when it occurs.
VaR is often measured daily and rarely extends beyond a few weeks, and because it is a
very short-term measure, it assumes that tomorrow will be more or less like today. VaR also
underestimates risk before a crisis as financial institutions are profitable and their strong capital
1 Many firms still use the 95 percent VaR, though others prefer 99 percent. J.P Morgan created a small group, RiskMetrics,
which later became a risk management consulting company. VaR had become so popular that it was considered the riskmodel gold standard.
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base allows them to take larger positions in the markets. When firms are recording higher profits
the historical returns used to calculate VaR are higher, so there are less bad days than good
days, hence the worst day loss will be less. Therefore, we can say VaR is pro-cyclical.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb argues that risk managers care about what happens in the other 1
percent, at the extreme edge of the curve, and not the number that falls within the 99 percent
probability. He says, “You could lose $51 million instead of $50 million — no big deal. That
happens two or three times a year, and no one blinks an eye. You could also lose billions and
go out of business. VaR has no way of measuring which it will be.” Taleb calls these events “fat
tails” or “black swans.” [35].
A risk measure that doesn’t provide a comprehensive understanding of an organization’s risk
exposure if used at a system-wide level can lead to extreme events such as GFC ’08. Moreover,
single institution’s risk measure does not necessarily reflect its connection to overall systemic
risk.
CoVaR is simply the VaR of the whole financial sector conditional on institution i. CoV aR of
the financial system j conditional on institution i at a given quantile q can be defined as

P (X j ≤ CoV aRqj|i |X i = V aRqi ) = q
X j represents asset returns of the financial system j and X i represents the asset returns of bank
i. So, we can say there is q% chance that the asset returns of the financial system become less
j|i

than CoV aRq within a specified time period given that returns of bank i are at its q% VaR
level.
∆CoV aR is the difference between the CoVaR conditional on the distress of an institution
and the CoVaR conditional on the median state of that institution.
Adrian and Brunnermeier calculate ∆CoV aR using quantile regression on weekly data with
the quantile q set to 5% using a set of state variables including include the change in the threemonth yield, the change in the slope of the yield curve, a short-term TED spread, the change in
the credit spread, the market return, the real estate sector return, and equity volatility. They
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estimate the quantile regressions in the following way: [7].
Xti = αqi + γqi Mt−1 + iq,t .
System|i

Xt

System|i

= αqi|System + γqSystem|i Mt−1 + q,t
System|i

Here Xti denotes the quarterly return of bank i, Xt

+ βqSystem|i .

the weekly system equity return con-

ditional on bank i, Mt is the list of state variables, αqi is the intercept, and iq,t is the error term.
They use q to denote the qth quantile. Then they use predicted values, denoted by the hat sign
from these regressions to obtain VaR and CoVaR.

i
V aRq,t
= α̂qi + γ̂qi Mt−1 .
i
i
CoV aRq,t
= α̂qSystem|i + γ̂qSystem|i Mt−1 + β̂qSystem|i V aRq,t
.
i
for each bank is computed as the difference between the q th percentile
Finally, ∆CoV aRq,t

CoV aR and the median CoV aR.
i
i
i
∆CoV aRq,t
= CoV aRq,t
− CoV aR50,t
= β̂qSystem|i (V ARiq,t − V ARi50,t ).

Acharya et al. (2017) proposes another model-based measure of systemic risk by using a financial firm’s marginal expected shortfall (MES) and components of Systemic Expected Shortfall
(SES) to calculate systemic risk.[3]. Although MES and SES are coherent measures of risk their
main components are both individual financial firm and sector-wide leverage. In reality, not all
leverage is equivalent, whether it is long-term debt, short-term rollover debt, life insurance premiums, deposits, and so on. Moreover, some risks may not be measured at all, especially those
related to off-balance sheet financing which played a role in the GFC’08.
Brownlees and Eagle (2017) introduce a measure called SRISK defined as the expected capital
shortfall of a financial entity conditional on a prolonged market decline to construct rankings of
systemically risky institutions. SRISK is a function of the size of the firm, its degree of leverage,
and its expected equity loss conditional on the market decline. Their results show that an increase
in SRISK predicts future declines in industrial production and increases in the unemployment
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rate. The results also suggest that the predictive ability of SRISK is stronger at longer horizons,
however, crisis can appear in the short-run due to sudden shocks to the system which someone
applying SRISK might not see coming. [23].
Cao (2010) proposes a systemic risk measure to efficiently capture the systemic importance
of each financial institution within a given system. To calculate each institution’s marginal
systemic risk contribution to the whole system, the author uses a measure called Multi-CoVaR.
Then the author uses the Shapley value methodology to efficiently allocate total systemic risk
to each financial institution. Although this measure is effective in allocating total systemic risk
to each financial institution, a more robust forward-looking measure is needed to allocate risk
for financial institutions. [46].
Gray and Jobst (2013) present a forward-looking framework (“Systemic CCA”) using multivariate extreme value theory (EVT) to measure systemic solvency risk based on market-implied
expected losses of financial institutions. Systemic CCA identifies endogenous linkages affecting
joint expected losses during times of stress. Based on the expected losses arising from the variation of each individual firm’s expected losses, the joint probability of all firms experiencing
distress simultaneously is estimated. [15]. It is important to note that the assumptions that go
into the option pricing theory, extreme value measurement, and non-parametric specification
of dependence between individual default probabilities in the Systemic CCA approach might
be defied by financial market behavior. In a financial crisis, predictable outcomes generated by
historical precedent don’t work as the market is not functioning rationally as it is in a panic
state. Hence, there are limitations in Systemic CCA in analyzing systemic solvency risk. [15].
Ruza et al. (2019) constructed a composite indicator (CI) for analysing the resilience and
stability of banking systems of developed countries. This tool is used to appraise the health of
the most salient banking systems. The authors apply multiple factor analysis to identify the main
determinants of banks’ resilience and stability for the group of G7 countries, Spain and Portugal,
from 2004 up to 2015. The results were mixed as some countries improved their ranking post the
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crisis while others were evolving in the opposite direction. These findings are very broad, hence,
it is difficult to ascertain the potential weaknesses and areas of improvement in each case. [24].
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) propose a measure, Joint Probability of Default (JPoD), to
assess systemic risk and estimating a set of stability measures of the banking system by using
a very limited set of publicly available data. An advantage of using limited data is that JPoD
can measure the distress of non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) i.e., insurance companies,
hedge funds etc. Hence, this measure works effectively for countries with a less developed financial
sector where shadow banking is a major part of the financial system. [33].
Pompella et al. (2016) built a measure known as bank Resilience index (bRi) to test the
soundness of accounting-based solvency of banks, over a five-year period. Their sample consists
of 246 banks from across the globe, and the four indicators they select to represent a bank’s
vulnerability include Tier 1 Ratio, net interest spread, common equity to total assets, and nonperforming loans to total loans. BRi is calculated using a series of standard deviations for each of
the indicators. The authors conclude that this index is an effective test to measure the resiliency
of banks as it is a continuous measure, unlike VAR. Although bRi is effective in catching any
worsening tendency, in advance, the regulatory framework it uses for the indicators varies greatly
across each country leading to inconsistencies in building the index. Additionally, bRi does not
act as an early warning system to detect deficiencies in capital ratios. [38].

3.4 Impact of Regulations on Systemic Risk
Preceding the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. launched The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in
response to the GFC’08 to buy “toxic” securities on the secondary market. Berger et. al (2020)
investigate whether TARP reduced or increased systemic risk. By employing the differencein-difference method their analysis examines the systemic risk contributions of TARP banks
relative to non-TARP banks after the TARP program was in effect. They use Normalized SRISK
(NSRISK, Brownlees and Engle, 2017), and Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES, Acharya et al.,
2017) as their measures of systemic risk. Their results suggest that TARP reduced contributions
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to systemic risk. However, it is important to note that TARP intervention effects are relatively
short-lived and may be reversed in the long run. [11].
Xu et al. (2019) analyzes how bank profitability impacts financial stability by conducting a
panel regression analysis. They also examine how bank profitability affect systemic and idiosyncratic risks for 431 publicly traded banks (U.S., advanced Europe, and GSIBs) from 2004 to
2017. They find that profitability is negatively associated with both a bank’s contribution to
systemic risk and its idiosyncratic risk. [42].
Huang et al. (2020) assessed the impact of Dodd-Frank Act in reducing the systemic risk in
the US banking system by employing the synthetic control method combined with the differencein-differences method. The treatment group consists of large U.S Bank Holding Companies with
$50 billion or more in total consolidated assets in 2010. Large EU BHCs are included in the
donor pool. Systemic risk is measured by means of the ∆CoV aR and MES approaches. They
conclude that the DFA did not have a significant impact on reducing systemic risk in the US
banking system. [31].
There is little doubt that regulators have an important role to play in monitoring and managing systemic risk. Anand et al. (2014) identify three basic regulatory objectives that the
regulatory architecture must address: macro-economic stability typically associated with central
banks in terms of implementing monetary policy and acting as lender of last resort in maintaining
liquidity in the financial system; micro-prudential regulation which focuses on the financial stability of individual financial institutions; and conduct of business regulation designed to protect
consumers of financial services and investors in financial institutions. Higher quality regulatory
capital requirements are generally thought to lower systemic risk posed by financial institutions.
[13].
Vallascas et al. (2012) identifies which bank characteristics offer a shelter from systemic shocks
and compares the relative effects of several hypothetical prudential rules on a bank’s risk exposure for an extensive sample of listed banks across 17 European countries. They show that
imposing regulatory constraints on bank size appears the most effective tool to reduce the de-
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fault risk of a bank given systemic events. While the prudential rules prospected by the Basel III
Accord are useful, they argue that the rules should be accompanied by additional restrictions
on banks. By running a regression analysis with systemic risk as to the dependent variable,
they conclude that the risk exposure of banks, both in normal and extreme systemic conditions,
increases with size, the share of non-interest income activities, and the growth of earning assets.
[44].

4
Method and Results

In this chapter, we conduct an empirical study to assess the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act
on systemic risk in the U.S. financial system. Section 4.1 describes our method to evaluate the
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act and goes over the sample data, Section 4.2 closely looks at
our dependent variable, Section 4.3 introduces our variable of interest, Section 4.4 describes our
independent variables, Section 4.5 provides a summary of our data, Section 4.6 discusses our
main results, and Section 4.7 contains robustness checks.

4.1 Empirical Methodology
In our model, we have a long, narrow panel as we have a considerable amount of time series
observations on a relatively small number of cross-sectional units. We select panel data because
of its capacity to capture the complexity of the financial system as in this model we have more
degrees of freedom and variability. Variability is created through combining variation across
units with variation over time, solving multicollinearity problems. Another advantage of using
panel data is that it uncovers dynamic relationships by exploiting information on the dynamic
reactions of each of several financial institutions. Most economic behavior is inherently dynamic
so most econometrically interesting relationships are explicitly or implicitly dynamic. [36].
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Our panel data set consists of 14 U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHC) with consolidated
assets equal to or greater than $50 billion in 2010 from the years of 1995:Q1 to 2013:Q2 and
American International Group (AIG). The rationale for picking banks with an asset value over
$50 billion is the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s 2013 annual report which explains
that many provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are issued to limit the incentives and abilities
of financial institutions with consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50 billion to take
risks. All 14 BHC’s are included in Federal Reserve’s stress testing introduced in 2012. There
are five big BHC’s as they account for 78.7% of the total assets in 2010 of the 14 BHC’s and
AIG in our sample. These five BHC’s are a subset of the big six that are subject to higher
regulatory standards as they are usually perceived as TBTF financial institutions. AIG got the
systemically important financial institution label after it was rescued from bankruptcy in 2008
by a government bailout of $182 billion. AIG was considered a heavyweight in selling insurance
against investment losses making it susceptible to downturns in the financial market. Although
the systemic risk label for AIG was removed in 2017, we still use it in my sample as my data
goes to 2013.
Every financial institution has its own distinct characteristics that are embedded in its DNA
like their investment strategy, appetite for risk and capital structure which contribute to systemic
risk. These characteristics usually don’t change with time as decisions are made at the boardlevel which hardly sees any substantial changes over time. We call these characteristics time
invariant.
Regression analysis typically uses a methodology called Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). OLS
fits the regression equation that minimizes the sum of the squared residuals by taking the square
of each residual before adding them all up. For our empirical study, we do not use the OLS
method as we would get different intercepts for each financial institution in our sample because
there are a number of unmeasured variables that determine our dependent variable. Hence, we
can say that OLS is biased unless the influence of these omitted variables is uncorrelated with the
other independent variables. This bias is known as omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias
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can lead to endogeneity which occurs when the independent variables may be influenced by the
dependent variable or both may be jointly influenced by an unmeasured third. We can remove
this bias by putting in a dummy for each individual financial institution so each individual
financial institution has its own intercept. This is known as the fixed-effects model.
The fixed-effect model uses the fixed effects estimator to make the difference between financial
institutions systematic by removing the unobserved effect that is correlated with the independent
variables. In this model, the observations of each individual financial institution have subtracted
from them the average of all of the observations for that individual financial institution. Hence,
our original equation will look like this:
Ȳit = β0 + β1 x̄1it + β2 x̄2it + β3 x̄3it + β4 x̄4it + β5 x̄5it + β6 x̄6it + β7 x̄7it + (cit + µ̄it)
Yit − Ȳit = β1 (x1it − x̄1it ) + β2 (x2it − x̄2it ) + β3 (x3it − x̄3it ) + .... + β7 (x7it − x̄7it )(µit + µ̄it)
However, the fixed effects model has certain disadvantages. In this model, there is a trade-off
between consistency and efficiency as by adding a different intercept we lose degrees of freedom.
Also, by applying the fixed effects model we wipe out all explanatory variables that do not
vary within an individual financial institution so we cannot estimate a slope coefficient for timeinvariant variables. Keeping in mind that our dataset consists of numerous financial institutions
that differ in investment strategy, areas of business, and capital structure it is highly possible
that these time-invariant characteristics impact our independent variables.
Another way to allow for different intercepts is by using the random-effects model. In this
model, we have an overall intercept as intercepts are interpreted as normally distributed, and a
composite error. The composite error contains the time-invariant error, however, the randomeffects model recognizes that the variance-covariance matrix of this composite error is nonspherical. The variance-covariance matrix is created as observations on different financial institutions are assumed to have zero correlation with their composite errors. The random-effects
estimator essentially transforms the data by “partially demeaning” each variable and estimates
the variance-covariance matrix. Instead of subtracting the entire unit-specific mean, only part
of the mean is subtracted. We use the Hausman statistic to determine which model is more
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appropriate for our study by testing if the random effect estimator is unbiased. The estimates
from running the fixed effects and random effects are stored in the vectors β̂ F E and β̂ RE . The
Hausman test is based on seeing if the random effects estimate is insignificantly different from
the unbiased fixed effects estimate. The Hausman statistic is computed as follows:

0

H = (β̂ F E − β̂ RE ) [V ar(β̂ F E ) − V ar(β̂ RE )]−1 (β̂ F E − β̂ RE ).

When the Hausman statistic is computed, if we get a value of 1 the null is not rejected, hence
the random effects estimator is used. If the Hausman statistic is equal to 0 the null is rejected
and the fixed effect estimator is used.

4.2 Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is ∆CoV aR calculated at a 95% confidence interval. ∆CoV aR is in
units of quarterly percent of total market equity loss rates, and is used to measure systemic risk.
∆CoV aR is the difference between the financial system’s VaR conditional on firm i’s distress
and the financial system’s VaR conditional on firm i’s median state. We obtain the data for
∆CoV aR from New York Fed’s website.

4.3 Variable of Interest
Our vairable of interest is the Dodd-Frank Act which was introduced in July 2010 to mitigate
systemic risk. This variable codes for 1 when the Dodd-Frank was actually enacted, i.e 2011:Q1
to take into account any time lags for implementing policy, and 0 preceding 2011. We expect
the coefficient of this variable to be negative as under the Dodd-Frank Act a Financial Stability
Oversight Council was formed to identify systemic risks and recommend policies to regulatory
bodies. The council recommended policies such as risk-based capital requirements, leverage
limits, and liquidity requirements which are focused on reducing systemic risk in the system.
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4.4 Independent Variables
Our original panel regression is estimated as follows:

∆CoV aR = β0 + β1 x1it + β2 x2it + β3 x3it + β4 x4it + β5 x5it + β6 x6it + β7 x7it + (cit + µit )

Where x1it denotes GDP per capita for financial institution i in quarter t.x2it represents quarterly
GDP deflator for financial institution i in quarter t. x3it captures the quarterly LIBOR rate for
financial institution i in quarter t. x4it denotes the quarterly government benchmark bond yield
for financial institution i in quarter t. x5it is the dummy variable Dodd-Frank Act, x6it is the
dummy variable GFC’08, and x7it is the dummy variable for the dot-com crash. cit is the time
time-invariant part of the error term and µit is the time variant part of the error term.
In our empirical analysis, we control for variables that can impact systemic risk in the financial
system in different ways. To capture macroeconomic fundamentals, we use economic growth
measured by quarterly GDP per capita and inflation which is measured by GDP deflator.
We use GDP per capita as a proxy for cyclical conditions in the economy. Economic growth
is often linked to financial liberalization as firms are taking on more insolvency risk. It is widely
believed that a risky economy will, on average, grow faster than a safe economy hence higher
economic growth leads to more systemic risk-taking, and as a result financial fragility increases
in the financial system leading to a crisis. Therefore, we expect β1 to be positive.
Rising inflation points to an overheating economy. According to the quantity theory of money,
an increase in money supply leads to an increase in inflation. On the other hand, low and stable
inflation can help the economy recover from a recession so we can say inflation and economic
recovery go hand in hand. For our study, we expect inflation to have a negative correlation with
systemic risk as when inflation rises we can expect a stimulated economy with high levels of
growth so the capital base of firm improves as they are getting higher returns on their positions.
So, we expect β2 to be negative.
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Liquidity risk plays a central role in perpetuating systemic risk in the system. A liquidity
crisis emerges when financial institutions that have fragmented capital structures hold assets
with long-term duration or low liquidity and highly short-term liabilities on their balance sheets.
To reflect liquidity in the money market, we control for interest rate captured by LIBOR
which is the daily average interest rate at which leading banks borrow funds of a sizable amount
from other banks. We convert the daily LIBOR rate to quarterly by taking the average LIBOR
rates in that quarter. A low-interest rate means a lower effective cost of capital which allows
borrowers to attain greater leverage and invest more. Additionally, debt servicing cost decreases
for firms so due to these reasons, a lower interest rate is often associated with lower systemic
risk. This positive relationship between interest rate and systemic risk implies β3 is positive.
During GFC’08, the fed created massive amounts of liquidity through an economic stimulus
program known as quantitative easing and reduced the interest rate.
Our other potential confounder government benchmark bond yield reflects a country’s
sovereign risk. To measure the government benchmark bond yield, we use the monthly yield
on the 10-year government benchmark bond. The monthly yield is converted to quarterly by
taking the average of the monthly yields in that quarter. A sovereign bond yield can be defined as
an interest rate the government pays to service its outstanding yield. Risk premiums imposed on
corporations are also calculated using sovereign bond yields so it is important to take sovereign
bond yields into consideration when talking about systemic risk. Usually, a higher bond yield
denotes high-interest rates in the country which means the country has a high sovereign risk
implying higher systemic risk. Hence, we expect β4 to be positive.
The other control variable we use in our study is a dummy variable for the dot-com crash of
2000. The dot-com bubble burst in 2000 leading to high systemic risk in the financial system
from 2000-2002. This variable codes for 1 when the dot-com crash was at its peak and 0 at all
other times. We expect β7 to be positive due to the high systemic risk during the dot-com crash.
Lastly, the other dummy variable we use is the GFC ‘08. This variable codes for 1 when the
GFC ‘08 was at its peak and before any policy response from the government was launched and
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0 for all other times. To make our findings robust we include using various lengths of GFC ’08.
We observe a clear impact from GFC ’08 when systemic risks got elevated which makes our
results are highly sensitive to the definition of the length of GFC ’08. We consider four different
scenarios regarding the duration of GFC ’08 which are as follows:
1. Base case: 2008:Q3-2010:Q4
2. Moderate case: 2008:Q3-2012:Q3
3. Conservative case: 2007:Q2-2009:Q2
4. Extreme case: 2007:Q2-2013:Q2
During the GFC ‘08, systemic risk was at its highest as most financial institutions were under
distress so we expect β6 to be positive.
Overall, these variables help us isolate the statistical relationship between systemic risk and
the Dodd-Frank Act while taking into account other factors that might affect systemic risk.

4.5 Summary Statistics

The table above provides summary statistics of our dependent and independent variables. In
terms of contribution of systemic risk, ∆CoV aR has a mean of 1.6% which means that on
average we are 95% confident that over the next quarter the financial sector won’t lose more
than 1.6% market equity conditional on the financial sector being in distress in excess of the
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CoVaR of the system in the median state. Low standard deviation of 0.7% points to relatively
less volatility in systemic risk from 1995Q1 to 2013Q2. Systemic risk was mostly stable, and
gently rising until it touched its peak of 6.7 % in 2008.
Market equity is the market capitalization of any institution which is the product of current
stock price and total number of outstanding shares. Market equity is also known as market
capitalization which is the product of current stock price of an institution, and its total number
of outstanding shares. If a firm has negative market equity, they are considered insolvent as they
have more liabilities than assets. In our study, the market equity is the average market equity of
the 15 biggest financial institutions in the U.S. It is important to note that 1.6% might not be
an accurate depiction of the growing risk in the system, as for the maximum time in our data set
the market value of these financial institutions was growing. The mean is a measure of central
tendency which is a manageable and meaningful summary of the data set as mean merely takes
the sum of ∆CoV aR and divides each by the number of observations which are 1110. Hence,
mean is not an accurate measure for our purposes as we’re looking to assess the impact of the
Dodd-Frank Act.

To study the relationship between the Dodd-Frank Act and the ∆CoV aR we can use covariance and correlation as they describe how two variables are related. Covariance is not a good
interpretation of how strong the relationship is between two variables is because you can’t compare variances over data sets with different scales so we use correlation coefficient because its
numerical limitations, -1 to 1, are more useful for determining how strong the relationship is
between the two variables. In my dataset, shown in the figure above, the correlation coefficient
is -0.055 implying that the relationship between the Dodd-Frank Act and ∆CoV aR is weak, but
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the negative sign indicates that the Dodd-Frank Act and ∆CoV aR are negatively correlated
which means systemic risk went down in the system when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted.

4.6 Panel Regression Results
As many factors contribute to systemic risk, as we discussed before, we control for a number of
variables when we run our random effects panel regression. We got a value of 1 for our Hausman
statistic so we couldn’t reject the null in favor of the fixed-effects estimator. The Hausman
statistic suggests the random effect model is more appropriate pointing to large heterogeneity in
our sample. Based on this result, we can say that that the variations between the 14 BHC’S and
AIG is random and not systematic. This result is in line with our expectations as each financial
institution has its own distinct characteristics which do not change with time. The random effect
estimation does not wipe out the explanatory variables that are time invariant. It is important
to consider these time invariant factors as a shock affects each financial institution differently.
In GFC ’08 some banks suffered more than others e.g Lehman Brothers suffered more than
Goldman Sachs due to the difference in their business models. Each financial institution in
our sample has different values for variables that capture an institution’s business model. For
instance, no two banks have the same debt-to-equity ratio, return on assets, price to book
ratio, etc. Each bank had its own business strategy of when to enter and exit the housing
market leading up to GFC’08 which affected its problem loan ratio and leverage ratio.

1

In

2007, Goldman Sachs had a leverage ratio of 25, whereas, Lehman Brothers had a leverage ratio
31 making Lehman more susceptible to a downturn in the housing market. All these variables
contribute to idiosyncratic risk, and could be extended to systemic risk. Hence, we can safely
conclude that for the purposes of our analysis the random effects model is superior to the fixed
effects model.
1 According to the CFI, the problem loan ratio is a ratio in the banking industry that compares the percentage of problem
loans to the percentage of sound loans. A leverage ratio is any kind of financial ratio that indicates the level of debt incurred
by a business entity against several other accounts in its balance sheet, income statement, or cash flow statement
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Our findings reveal that Dodd-Frank Act is negatively associated with systemic risk. According
to our limited data, when the Dodd-Frank was enacted in July 2010 ∆CoV aR went down by
0.44%. Technically, this means that if we were 95% confident that over the next quarter the
financial sector won’t lose more than 8.44% of market equity conditional on the financial being
in distress in excess of the CoVaR of the system in the median state, after the Dodd-Frank Act
passed we are 95% confident that over the next quarter the financial sector won’t lose more than
8% of market equity in excess of the CoVaR of the system in the median state. Hence, systemic
risk went down by 0.44%, making the financial system somewhat safer. Moreover, our p-value is
0.00 which means we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the Dodd-Frank
Act is 0 making our result statistically significant.
An intuitive explanation is that financial institutions become more conservative when regulations get tighter as they engage in less risk taking activities. This reduction in risk can be
contributed to the numerous features of the Dodd-Frank Act that were aimed at reducing systemic risk in the financial sector. Initiatives like The Office of Financial Research (OFR), stress
tests, and regulation of OTC derivatives helped decrease potential risk exposures. A top-down
analysis backed by data collected by the OFR helped regulators look beyond the traditional
accounting-based measures. The regulators conducted scenario analysis on the major financial
institutions to determine the needed capital buffer. This tailored analysis led to firm-specific
policy actions which allowed market participants to price risk more accurately.
However, in the scheme of things, we would expect the Dodd-Frank Act to have a more
profound impact on systemic risk than our results reveal. Overall, our results suggest that the
Dodd-Frank Act did not have a significant impact on systemic risk. When we look at the peak
value of the mean ∆CoV aR in 2008 which was close to 5%, as shown in the figure on the next
page, then a reduction of 0.44% associated with the Dodd-Frank Act is a blip. The figure on
the next page confirms that the Dodd-Frank Act was unable to bring systemic risk down to preGFC’08 levels which were close to 2%. However, the sudden decrease in ∆CoV aR post-GFC’08
and pre-Dodd-Frank Act can be attributed to the Great Recession and slowdown of economic

4.6. PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS

45

activity in 2009-10. These results are by no means encouraging and point to bigger issues in the
risk-taking culture of banks. Our findings are in line with other studies done on effectiveness of
the Dodd-Frank Act who are skeptical of the Dodd-Frank Act’s effect on systemic risk. Huang
et al. (2020) and Acharya et al. (2017) find that the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act did not
reduce systemic risk in the financial system. [4] [31].
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4.7 Robustness
A number of further robustness checks were carried out, including varying the length of our
data, and running a separate regression for the big 5.
When we consider a full sample that embeds both crisis (Dot-com crash and GFC’08) and
normal times from 1995 to 2013, the Dodd-Frank Act reduces systemic risk in the moderate and
extreme case. We reject the base case and extreme case as the p-value is well over 0.05 so the
results are statistically insignificant.
An interesting finding emerges when we change the beginning of our data to post 2002:Q2
from 1995:Q1. On running the conservative case, systemic risk actually increases in the system
by 0.3%. We discuss this result as it has the highest Wald statistic suggesting the model is a good
fit, and a p-value of 0 making it statistically significant. This is an exceptional finding that is
in direct contradiction with our previous results. A possible explanation of this result is that we
assume GFC ’08 ended in 2009:Q2 so banks began taking moderate risks to make up for the losses
they incurred in the crisis. Additionally, banks exploited the low interest rate environment and
continued borrowing at lower rates than are necessary for their risk levels because the market
believes these banks are still protected by the government. Another explanation might be as
Mehrsa Baradaran (2014) explains that regulating banks under hypothetical risk modeling in
the Dodd-Frank Act lead to an increase private financial risk taking. [16].

4.7.1

Endogeneity

There is a concern that endogeneity may arise in our model as banks might have responded
to the Dodd-Frank Act in advance to avoid stricter regulation making it difficult for us to
observe the treatment effect of the Dodd-Frank Act to reduce systemic risk. Banks could do
this by shrinking their assets less than $50 billion. We address this concern by using systemic
risk measures that are based on market data rather than financial data of banks. It is nearly
impossible for institutions to manipulate market data, so we are confident that we avoid the
endogeneity concern.
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Big 5

It is generally thought that the Dodd-Frank Act had a larger impact on the big six banks: J.P
Morgan, Wells Fargo, Citibank, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs. We
don’t include Goldman Sachs due to lack of data so we consider the big five for our robustness
check. Running a separate panel regression for just the big five banks using a moderate length
of GFC’08 we find that the Dodd-Frank Act reduced systemic risk in the big five by 0.46 %
compared to 0.44 % for the other fifteen financial institutions. These results suggest that the
Dodd-Frank Act exerted a slightly greater impact on the big five relative to the other financial
institutions in our sample. However, this difference is so minuscule that we can say the DoddFrank Act impacted both the big 5 and other financial institutions in a similar fashion.
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5
Conclusion

Financial firms play a critical role in the economy. They act as intermediaries between parties
that are looking to invest and parties that need investment to finance their businesses. This
intermediation affects society at large as financial transactions are a part of everyday life, for
example, student loans, house mortgages, automobile loans, business loans, etc. Finance has
tremendous potential to benefit society if this intermediation works seamlessly.
The cyclical nature of the modern economy is inherently unstable, so when we are faced with
a crisis financial intermediation is impaired. The challenge remains to limit finance’s ability to
do damage while harnessing its benefits to drive economic growth. This can only be done by
making the financial sector antifragile. Anti-fragility, a concept developed by Nassim Nicholas
Taleb, goes beyond robustness; it means that something does not merely withstand a shock but
actually improves because of it.
Our results help us identify the challenges in identifying and measuring systemic risk. Understanding and overcoming these challenges is critical in laying a framework for future reforms
that can make the financial sector antifragile. Systemic risk emerges when the financial sector
is not capitalized enough to cover its liabilities, however, there is no widely accepted measure
of systemic risk. Academics have taken the initiative to develop systemic risk measures which
we talk about extensively in the literature review chapter. So far, none of them have been able
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to develop a measure that can precisely measure risk, leverage, interconnectedness of complex
financial institutions. Hence, at the regulatory level there is no measure deemed accurate enough
to act as a systemic measure. In our paper, we use ∆CoV aR, but we face several difficulties because of limited data. Developing a single systemic risk measure implemented at the regulatory
level is the first step towards identifying and consequently mitigating risks.
The Dodd-Frank Act is an attempt to solve the issues relating to systemic risk by recommending a variety of criteria for the systemic risk regulators. This criterion falls short of reducing
systemic risk, as by simply creating guidelines we cannot tackle the issue of systemic risk. While
the Dodd-Frank Act includes stricter standards such as, leverage limits, capital requirements,
liquidity requirements, etc., the Dodd-Frank Act does not impose restrictions on bank holding
companies like that in the Glass-Steagall Act. These strict regulations may not be too costly
for the TBTF firms. We observed in our results, that the Dodd-Frank Act affected the big 5
in a similar fashion to the other financial institutions in our sample. This can be attributed
to a clause in the Dodd-Frank Act that states that in a crisis the solvent part of the financial
sector should cover the losses of the failed part of the sector. The moral hazard created by this
clause, and the TBTF guarantee does not disincentivize the big banks from taking excessive
risks. TBTF firms can be disincentivized from indulging in risky activities if they are forced to
internalize the systemic risk costs imposed by the TBTF firms on the financial system.
The negative externality of systemic risk can be taxed through Pigouvian taxes. Pigouvian
taxes are efficient as they don’t require a heavy-handed government intervention into the decision
making of firms. The systemic risk tax has been implemented in quite a few developed countries
like the UK, France, and Germany. U.K imposed a 0.07 % tax on risky liabilities as an incentive
for firms to reduce risk. However, this tax is not particularly sophisticated as the definition of
risky liabilities is loose. There are mainly two ways to implement a systemic risk tax: regulatorbased and market-based.
Acharya (2011) proposes a regulator-based approach to calculate systemic risk tax. He suggests
that the tax should equal the sum of the following two components: firm’s expected losses upon
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default and the product of the expected systemic costs in a crisis and contribution of the firm
to these costs. Every firm has a different expected loss upon default, so to make the calculation
simpler the expected loss upon default is equal to the government guarantee the firm enjoys.
Whereas, the contribution of the firm to systemic risk will increase when the firm is undercapitalized and holding increasing tax. [4].
A market-based solution entails buying insurance from the private market for insurance against
a firm’s own losses. In the event of a payout, the government will receive the payment in place of
the firm. This approach will allow the market to determine the firm’s contribution to systemic
risk, while the firm will be forced to internalize the costs of risk-taking by paying a premium.
We suggest a public-private partnership in executing this tax as not all insurers are capitalized
enough to cover losses incurred in a systemic event. Under this partnership, the insurer will
have to pay the government a percentage of every dollar by which the institution’s capital falls
below the required capital. This will push the insurer to price the systemic risk accurately. The
insurance plan will be reviewed twice a year to ensure effective monitoring of risk, and prevent
sudden high insurance premiums.
There are many challenges in imposing this tax. Firstly, a resolution authority like that of
FDIC needs to be set up to deal with short-term liabilities like foreign deposits, uninsured
deposits, etc. Short-term liabilities have implicit guarantees that need to be priced appropriately.
Secondly, it is extremely difficult to calculate the expected systemic risk costs of a financial crisis
as we need to consider asset bubbles, market volatility, and leverage. These factors make the
calculations pro-cyclical.
In the future, we need counter-cyclical and forward-looking risk measures that generate warning signs helping us preempt systemic risk, and a looming crisis. This can be made possible
through a fully transparent bottom-up approach to systemic risk categorization. Every firm
needs to publicly disclose their positions which allows regulators to produce systemic risk reports. The TBTF guarantees should be contingent on providing comprehensive systemic risk
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reports. A resolution authority can then utilize these reports to establish a systemic risk measurement framework and a recapitalization plan to wither a crisis.
The Dodd-Frank Act lays out requirements and standards for capital buffers to ensure banks
have adequate capital to cover exceeding the loan loss provisions. It is difficult to ascertain
requirements and standards for capital requirements as each bank imposes a different risk to
the system. Current policy efforts should be geared towards establishing a regulatory framework
that includes a market-wide perspective of supervision rather than being concerned with the
viability of individual institutions only. Developing a sound understanding of systemic risk is
crucial for formulating policy to build a more resilient financial system.
This system isn’t fragile because of bubbles it’s fragile because we haven’t designed systems
to respond to crises. Future regulation needs to be “dynamic” as a rigid regulatory system soon
becomes obsolete. Moreover, a “one size fits all approach” is not viable as regulation has varying
impacts for different countries depending on the robustness of their banking sector. The financial
sector is the brain of the modern economy, so making the financial sector safe gets one step closer
towards the goal of economics which is to improve the human condition.
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